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A NORTH-SOUTH MODEL OF TAXATION AND CAPITAL FLOWS
This paper presents a simple two-country model of the role of taxation 
in
capital flows between developed countries ("The North") and developing
countries ("The South"). The Southern country is assumed to be unable 
to
enforce a tax on its residents' foreign-source income, and the 
Northern
country chooses not to impose a withholding tax on portfolio income earned 
in
its country.
The world equilibrium in the model is characterized by excessive (by the
standard of global efficiency and Southern welfare) flows of capital across
borders, and insufficient investment located in the South. National income of
the South could, under certain conditions, be improved if the North would
impose a withholding tax on portfolio income that leaves the country, even
though the South sacrifices tax revenue to the North. A Southern tax on
foreign-source income may dominate this, depending on the resource cost of
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1. INTRODUCTION
Tax systems may exert a powerful influence on the location of investment and the
extent of cross-border capital flows. This influence is likely to be particularly strong for
flows between developed (Northern) and developing (Southern) countries, due to
fundamental asymmetries in their tax technologies and financial structures. Although there
has been much speculation on the role of taxation in capital flight, indebtedness, and related
problems, there has been little formal analysis of that role.
This paper presents a simple two-country model of the role of taxation in capital
flows. I call it a "Nonh-South" model because the two countries are assumed to differ in
ways that characterize developed and developing countries, respectively. In particular, the
Southern country is assumed to be different from the Northern country in three critical
ways.
First, the Southern country cannot enforce a tax on its residents' foreign-source
income. For example, as noted by McLure (1987), most Latin American countries do not
attempt to tax foreign-source income, and for those that do success is likely to be difficult
for adninistrative reasons.
Second, the financial structure of the Southerncountry is insufficiently developed
so that there arc real resource costs to Northern investment in the South. These costs
cannot be effectively circumvented by Southerners' borrowing from the North to invest in
domestic capital.
Finally, it is assumed that only Northerners have access to certain technologies
which can be applied profitably in the South. It is further assumed that the Northern
possessors of this technology choose to exploit it by undertaking direct investment in the
South, rather than through alternative means such as licensing the technology.
Given these assumptions the world equilibrium is characterized by excessive (by
the standard of global efficiency and Southern welfare) flows of wealth across borders, and
insufficient investment located in the South. National welfare of the South could, under
-l-
certain conditions, be improved if the North would impose a withholding tax on portfolio
income that leaves the country, even though it thereby sacrifices tax revenue to the
Northern country. A tax on foreign-source income may dominate this, depending on the
resource costs of enforcing such a tax.
2, TIHE ANALYTICAL MODEL
1.1 Basic Assumptions
I assume that there is a resource cost that must be borne for any Southern
investment owned or financed by a Northern resident. This cost includes the expense of
monitoring the firm or borrower and collecting information from afar. In practice the cost
per unit of investment in prn.tice prob*ably varies inverscly with the scale of the investment,
as there are likely to be fixed cost elements to monitoring and information gathering. It also
V usies inver:;cly with how developed the tnuiial system is in the Sou:hern country. For
ina.ny investments, such as purchases of stock sold in a highly developed stock market, this
cost will be small. t For othess, such as ownership of a Mom and Pop grocety store, the
cost wll likely dwad the expected gross return on the investment.
I represent the cost of monitoring and collecting infornation per dollar of
in-vehrnent as ctnmax(WNS ,0) - min(W ),0)J, where WLS is the Nothcrn portfolio
investment in the South and WSN is Southern portfolio investment in the North. Only
North-to-South investments have monitoring costs, to that only positive values of WL"
NS
and negative values of W (Southern borrowing from the North) affect the value of c.
Here the possible investments are ranked from lowest cost to highest cost, so that
:'(WL' ). the marginal tesource cost of Northern portfolio investment in the South. is non.
decreasing and is assumed to be positive whenever WVNS is positive. The value of
luis cost may be zero for some inveitments. For expositional convenience, I assume that
there is some positive cost for any Northern investment in the South, unless it is a direct
investment.
c'(WSN) is zero when WSN is positive and increases with increasing negative values of
WSN2
It, is also assumed that some Northerners have exclusive access to certain
technologies that can be profitably applied in the Southern country. This advantage could
be exploited by exporting products that embody the knowledge or by licensing the
technology to Southern firms. I assume instead that, for reasons not addressed here, the
Northern owner of the technology retains direct control over it by operating a branch or
subsidiary. To simplify the model, I further assume that the parent firm wholly owns the
subsidiary. To simplify the exposition, I refer to the Northern direct investment as the
high-tech (1-) sector, and the remaining Southern economy, in which Northerners may
make portfolio investments, as the low-tech sector (L).
2.2 Notation
I use the following notation:
KS: capital invested in hth sector located in South h = H ,L
2The assumption that cross-border wealtholdings are subject to increasing monitoring costs
places a limit on the tax arbitrage profits that would otherwise be unbounded due tothe
differential taxation of investments. As Slemrod (1988) elaborates, whenever the relative
rate of tax on investments is different for different investors, some investor will find one
investment to dominate another in terms of after-tax return. In a riskless world, this opens
the possibility of unlimited tax arbitrage profits by holding a short position in the lower-
yielding asset and a long position in the higher-yielding asset. This failure of equilibrium
can be eliminated by putting arbitrary restrictions on short holdings. as in Slemrod (1988),
or by introducing an increasing cost to extreme portfolio positions. The model of this paper
appeals to increasing monitoring costs of cross-border holdings. An alternative modelling
strategy is to introduce risk aversion and residence-specific risk. In this case, arbitrage
profits would be limited by investors' aversion to portfolios which are insufficiently
diversified among the capital of various countries. In essence, an increasing risk premium
would replace the increasing monitoring costs as the limit on cross-border holdings. The
analytical disadvantage of this modelling strategy is that, in the presence of risk, taxation
takes an insurance dimension which is difficult to disentangle from its revenue-raising
function. An alternative approach is to assume that foreign investment is subject to a risk of
expropriation by the host country which increases (because its attractiveness increases)
with the total volume of foreign investment.
10
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S: wealth of ith investor invested in hth sector in South h = H.L i = S.N
KN: capital invested in North
Wi: wealth of ith investor invested in North
W.: wealth of the ith investor i = S,N
f: high-tech production function
g: low-tech production function
rN: pre-tax rate of return earned on capital located in the North
The identity relationships that link the wealth and capital stock variables are
suimmarized in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1
By assumption, Southerners do not own high-tech capital in their country, so that
H
WSg is zero.
2.3 The Tax System
I make the following assumptions about the Northern tax system:
1. The capital income of Northerners is taxed at rate t.
2. Northern investors in the South are offered a modified foreign tax credit for
taxes paid to the Southern government. Effectively, the Northern government imposes a
repatriation tax on Southern investments equal to max[(t - u), 0]. where u is the Southern
tax rate and Y lies between zero and one. Note that the repatriation tax applies only if t
exceeds u; if it does not, no repatriation tax is due. The total effective tax on a Northerner's
investment in the South is thus (1-T) u + ymax(u,t). Compare this to a regular foreign tax
credit system, where the repatriation tax is equal to t - u when t exceeds u, and is zero
otherwise: the effective tax in this case is max(ut). This modified tax credit system is
meant to represent the fact that some Northern countries apply a regular foreign tax credit
and others operate on an exemption system, so that no repatriation tax is due and the
effective tax on Northerners is simply u.
3
3. The Northern government imposes no tax on Southern wealthowners'
investments in Northern assets. This assumption reflects the absence of withholding tax on
interest payments in the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom--and the low rate of
withholding tax on dividend payments. In the United States, foreign-owned businesses are
subject to U.S. corporate tax, but we have ruled out by assumption direct investment by
Southemers in the North.















I make the following assumptions about the Southern tax system:
1. The Southern government is unable to enforce any tax on the capital income
earned abroad by its residents.
2. The Southern government cannot impose differential tax rates on capital within
its borders depending on ownership.
Let t. and ui be the tax rates imposed by the Northern and Southern governments,
respectively, on income owned by residents of country i located in country j. Then the
asswnptions made above about the tax systems require that
(t) NS INN E t
(ii) tSN 0
(iii) uSN = 0
(iv) u =uNS -u
2.4 Investor Equilibrium
The Southern resident has two investment opportunities--Southern low-tech capital
(W5 ) and Northern capital, WSN. In equilibrium, it must be that:
(1) g' (WNS + WgS)(1 - u) = rN + c'(WSN).
NS SN S
The Northern investor has three investment opportunities--Southern high-tech
capital (Wis), Southern low-tech capital (WLNS). and Northern capital (WNN). This
investment equilibrium is characterized by two conditions as follows:
L L L
(2a) (g'(WNS + W5 3) - c'(WNS))(I - v) = rN(l - t) and
(2b) f(WNs)(l - v) = rN(- ~t)
WH + WL+ W W
NS NS+ NN .N
where v = (I - y) u + -pnax(u, t).
Equilibrium for the world economy is characterized by capital stock and wealth
allocations such that both investors are in investment equilibrium.
2.5 No-Tax Equilibrium
As a prelude to the characterization of equilibrium with taxes, it is worthwhile to
first consider the nature of world equilibrium in the absence of any taxes, so that t = u =
v = 0. In this case Northerners will invest in Southern high-tech capital until f(WN) =
rN.
The nature of the equilibrium rests on whether g'(W 5 ) is greater or less than rN. If
g'(W) is exactly equal to rN, then the equilibrium will feature no foreign portfolio
L
investment in either direction, so that W = WNS = 0, which implies that c' = 0 as well.
Equilibrium is characterized by g'= f = rN.
In the case where g'(WS) < rN, Southern wealth is on net invested in the North.
The net cross-border holdings are accomplished with zero resource cost at a point where
L L LWNS 0 and WSN 2 0. In this case the values of WNS and WSN, for a given WNS *
WSN, are indeterminate within this 
range.
Next consider the case where g'(W 5 ) > rN. In this case there are net Northern
L
portfolio holdings in Southern capital. This equilibrium will feature WNS > 0 and WSN <
0; i.e., both Southern borrowing from the North and Northern portfolio investment in the
L
South will occur. The precise mix of WNS and WSN that yields a given net portfolio flow
uf WNS - WSN is, however, indeterninate. Negative values of WNS or positive values
of WSN will never be observed, as these equilibria feature higher resource costs then is
minimal. Regardless of the mix, in equilibrium g'= rN + c'[max(WNS, 0) - min(WSN,
0)). The level of the Southern capital stock is lower than otherwise because of the
necessity of cross-border capital flows, which have real resource costs.
2.6 Equilibrium with Taxes
The pair of tax systems described earlier puts a penalty on the income from all
capital holdings except for one type--there is no tax on Southern ownership of Northern
L
capital. This provides an incentive for WSN and WNS to be larger than in a notax
equilibrium. Although it need not be true for all parameterizations. for expositional
convenience in much of what follows I will assume that the equilibrium is characterized by
L
positive values of WSN and WNS. In this case the equilibrium values of WSN and WNS
are unique.
In the tax equilibrium Northern portfolio investment in the South will proceed until
c' = g - ( l - )( - ))4 Using the fact that v = (1 - y)u + ymax(u, t), it can be shown
L
that this must always be positive. Denote this value of c' as t', and the value of WNS for
which c' - ' as \ . Total low-tech investment in the South will satisfy g'(Ks) =
--- , denote that level as K --- Then the level of Southern
investment in the North, WS, is equal to\i - KS (---+ "NS'
The equilibrium of this model captures several important characteristics of North-
South economic relations. Northern investors make direct (high-tech) and portfolio (low-
tech) investments in the South. At the same time Southern wealth owners have portfolio
investments in the North. How these cross-border capital flows respond to changes in
taxation is the subject of the next section.
4 To derive this and the expression for g' below from expressions (1) and (2) note that
c'(WSN) is zero when, as is assumed here, WSN is positive.
3. THE EFFECT OF TAXES ON THE EQUILIBRIUM
Assume that WSN>0 and WLNS > 0, so that c'(WSN) and c"(WSN) are zero, and
c'(WLNS)> 0. Taking the total derivatives of (1), (2a), and (2b), but holding t constant,
yields
(3a) (1 -u) g"(dK)- g'du=0
L L
(3b) (g' - c')(-dv) + (1 - v)(g"(dKS) - c"(dWNS)) = 0
(3c) f(-dv) + (1 - v)f'(dK ) = 0.
I first solve for the changes in capital and wealth holdings in terms of du and dv. Note
that c' and c" refer to c'(W N) and c"(W NS), respectively. Using the fact that
L L
dW = dW s - dKs, this yields
SN NS S
H f'dv
(4a) dK = ,,
S (0 -V )f
(4b) dKL
S (1 -u)g
(4c) dWL = -- Erdu -0 dv
(4d) dWSNdv
Several aspects of (4a)-(4d) are worth noting. First, K5 is affected only by theL
effective tax rate applying to Northerners, v, while KL is affected only by the Southern tax
rate. The former property implies that, when the North is on a foreign tax credit system
(y = 1), variations in u will not influence high-tech investment as long as u remains below
t. High-tech capital will respond negatively to u when the North is not completely foreign
I
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tax credit (y < 1) or when u exceeds t. The dependence of the capital and wealth allocations
on the tax rates are explored in more detail in the appendix to this paper.
The stock of low-tech capital in the South depends only on the Southern tax rate,
with capital declining as u increases. It will not respond to a change in Northern tax policy,
v, when u is held constant. A decrease in v will increase the amount of Northern
investment in Southern low-tech investment, but this will be offset exactly by an increase in
Southern investment in the North.
When WSN is less than zero (Southerners are borrowing from the North), so that
c"(WSN) is not always zero, these conclusions must be slightly modified. (The response
of capital and wealth allocations to taxation is presented in the appendix.) For example, in
this case v does have an (inverse) affect on KS holding u constant. Consider a decrease in
v. This attracts Northern investment to the South. As g' falls, Southerners reduce their
borrowing from the North. This decreases c', so that in the new equilibrium the total cost
of borrowing, rN + c', is lower. Thus Southern investors are willing to hold Southern
capital with a lower return, enabling a higher level of K 5 to persist. When W isS SN
positive so that c"(WSN) is zero, changing levels of cross-border wealth holdings do not
L L
alter the attractiveness (rN) of the Southern wealth owner's alternative to K 5. Thus KS
rN
does not change from K( rNu
4. TILE EFFICIENCY COST OF SOUTHERN TAXATION
National income in the South, denoted YSis equal to
II H L L H
(5) f(K 5) - rQH Ks + g(K 5) - r WNS + rNWSN + u[rQ HKH + (r - c')WNSI
L H L NS N N HS
+ [c'WNS - c(WNS)
Here rQ 1 and rQL denote the return, gross of Southern taxes and monitoring costs,
that Northern investors require to invest in Southern high-tech and low-tech capital,
respectively. Note that taxes paid by domestic residents do not affect national income,
although taxes paid to the South by Northern wealthowners, equal to u[rQ11 K +
L
(r QL - c')WNSJ, do increase national income. Expression (5) embodies the assumption
L L
that the profits of the monitoring sector, c'WNS - c(WNS), accrue to Southern residents.
From (2a) and (2b) it is clear that
rN(l - t)
(6a) rQL = L - v + c' and
rN( - t)
(6b) rQ H = I - v
Substituting for rQ1H and rQL into expression (5) and differentiating with respect to
u yields the following:
(7a) dY 5 = [f' - arNJdKS + [g' - (arN + c')]dK
H L
+ [(I - a)rN - c']dWSN - [a'rN](KS + WNS),
or, rearranging terms slightly,
(7b) dY 5 = [f - -arLK + [g' NZdKLS + [(l - a)rN - c']dWNSarN dS Ig  S   ed~
H L
arNKS + WNS)
( -U)(- t) , da -I + a(l Y)(1 - t)whereIa-du-I-and a' =-v when u < v and
a'= 0 if u> v.
It is useful for interpreting expressions (7a) and (7b) to consider two cases. In the






effective tax on Northern investment in the South is simply the Southern rate u. Thus v =
u, a = 1 - t and a'= 0. Then (7a) reduces to
H L
(8) dY = [f - rN(I "S + [g' - (r(1- t) + c')]dKs + [trN - c']dWSN'
The first two terms of expression (8) measure the welfare loss due to the reduction of the
domestic capital stock below its efficient level (i.e., where the marginal product equals the
opportunity cost of funds). The size of this cost depends on the elasticity of the marginal
product of high- and low-tech capital, and the tax wedge between the marginal product and
the opportunity cost.
The final temt indicates that there are welfare implications from induced changes in
Southern holdings of Northern capital. Increases in holdings of Northern capital increase
welfare by trN because the opportunity cost to the South of borrowing capital is
'N(I - t) + c', but the return to investing in the North is rN. There is a net change in
national income of trN - c' per unit of induced investment. Even if trN - c' is positive, this
potential gain to the country is not taken advantage of by private investors because the cost
of obtaining funds to the individual is rN, not rN(1 - t), of which trN is remitted to the
Southern government.
When u increases, dKH and dK 5 will be unambiguously negative, implying a
welfare loss. Both components of the third term may be of either sign, as may be the third
temi itself.
Thus, increasing u beyond t causes a welfare loss due to reducing the domestic
capital stock below its efficient size, but there may be an offsetting increase in welfare if it
induces the country to make tax arbitrage profits by in essence borrowing at the after-tax
world rate of interest and investing at the pre-tax rate of interest.
I turn now to the case where u is less than t (and v). Because the Northern
investors are partially subject to a foreign tax credit, increases in u raise revenue from
Northern investors that are not completely reflected in decreases in their after-tax rate of
return. To the extent that the foreign tax credit is operative (T close to one), increases in tax
paid to the Southern Government are offset by tax credits granted by the Northern
govemment.
First assume that the foreign tax credit is complete, so that y = 1, v = t, a =1 - u,
and a' = -1 . Referring to expression (7a) for the change in national income, it is clear that
each of the three terms in expression (8) is modified and a fourth term is added. When y=
H L H.
1, the fourth tenn reduces to rN(KS + WNS). Remember that K5 , the domestic high-tech
H L H L
capital stock, is owned completely by Northerners, so that K5 + WNS(= WNS + WNS)
represents total Northern holdings of Southern capital. An increase in u therefore increases
Southern welfare to the extent there is foreign investment, because revenue is collected
without raising the cost of capital to the country.
A change in u will have no effect on KH, so that the first term is irrelevant. An
increase in u will, though, decrease domestic investment in domestic capital, pushing up
g', which attracts foreign investment in domestic capital. Total domestic capital will be
lower, though, because the increased Northern investment pushes up c'--the same capital is
less attractive to the Northern wealth owner than to the Southern wealth owner. So, with
respect to an increase in u, (KSH =0, dKL <0, and dWSN > 0.
The welfare implications of these changes are different than the case when u > t,
L
though. A decrease in KS is less deleterious because the cost to the South of foreign
investment is rN(1 - u) + c', which is greater than rN(l - t) + c' when u < t. This is
because, in order to earn rN(1 - t) after all taxes, the Northern investor must still be paid rN
+ c' before any taxes. When u < t, though, the Southern government claims only urN of
this return, while the Northern government receives (t - u)rN. Thus the net cost to the
Southern country is rN(l - u) + c'.
The welfare implications of changes in WSN are also different than when u > t.
L L
[First, note that dWSN =-dKg + dWNS. That is, increases in Southern investment in the
I
1
North imply offsetting decreases in the Southern capital stock, except for increases in
Northern investment in the South.] The tax arbitrage gains to the Southern country of
increasing WSN are now lower. When u > t, the South could essentially borrow capital at
(1 - t)rN and invest in the North to earn rN. When u < t, the cost of borrowing is (1 -
u)rN, so that the tax arbitrage gain is urN, which is less than trN.
5. CAN THE NORTH HELP TILE SOUTH BY TAXING SOUTHERNERS?
in the absence of distortions, national income of the South would decline if the
North imposed taxes on Southern residents investing in the North, because it would limit
the income-earning opportunities of its residents. In this model with distortions, the North
can impose a withholding tax on income paid to foreigners that would increase Southern
welfare.
To see this. I introduce a withholding tax, denoted w. This alters the equilibrium
condition of the Southern wealthowner, assuming that WSN > 0 so d'= 0, to
(9) g'(K 5)(I - u)=rN(1 -w)
The equilibrium conditions for the Northern wealthowner remain
(2a) (g'(K 5 ) c'(WL))( 1 - v)= rN(1- t) andSNN
(2b) f(Ks)=rN(I t).
Differentiating with respect to w yields:
L
(11 a) (1 - u)g"(dKS)= - rN(dw)
L L






(12b) d ( - >u)g"0
L
dWNS -rN
(12c) Iw 1 - u)c"0
d\VS rN
(12d) dw (1 - u)jg'~cr
The withholding tax causes Southerners to return some of their wealth from the North to
the South, causes Northerners to return some of their wealth from the South, and results in
a net increase in the low-tech Southern capital stock.
The welfare consequences can be seen by adjusting the last term of (5) from
rNWSN to rN(1 - w)WSN and rederiving (7a) to yield
dY( L d 5 )dY5  jjCS d\VNSI
(13) -g-= -(g' -rN) dw + [trN c' + (1 -a)rN( - t) -wrNJ d WSN'
The first term is positive as long as w is below u. This represents the welfare gain from
increasing the domestic capital stock toward its optimum. The second term represents the
change in the tax arbitrage gain. The tax arbitrage from Southerners investing in the North
is now lower by the tax collected by the Northern government, wrN, and may be positive
or negative. The third term represents the direct loss to Southerners due to the tax
collected by the Northern government.H
(lIc) (I -v)f'(dK 5 )=0. I
Solving for the allocation changes yields
-17-
-16-
The change in Southern welfare can be positive if the welfare gain from increasing
the domestic capital stock can offset the revenue lost to the Northern government (and,
possibly, the loss of tax arbitrage gains). This is more likely to be true if the distortion in
the domestic capital stock (measured by g'-rN) is large, if the responsiveness of the
domestic capital stock is large (Ig"I is small), and if Southern wealthholdings in the North
(WSN) are relatively small.
6. SHOULD TIlE SOUTH TRY TO TAX ITS RESIDENTS'
FOREIGN-SOURCE INCOME?
Up to now I have assumed that the Southern government cannot collect any tax on
its residents' foreign-source capital income. More generally, it can raise some tax revenue,
but only at a substantial resource cost. Should it levy such a tax and, if so, at what rate?
Let z be the tax on foreign-source income, and let e(z) be the resource cost of levying a tax
at rate z. Using the same type of reasoning as above, the change in Southem welfare with
respect to z can be written as
dY dKL dWNS ,
(14) = N ) +[trN -c'+(1 - a)rN(1 - t - e'(z).
The allocational effects of increasing z are identical to that of increasing w, so that
KL L dWNLS dWNS
-- = --WSand dz- = d . Thus, expression (14) looks quite similar to that of(k dw dz dw
(13). The key difference (other than the absence of terms including w, which is assumed
to be zero) is that the tern -WSN is absent from (14). When the Southern government
imposes the tax instead of the Northern government, the tax revenue does not represent a
loss to the economy. Expression (14) does include the tenn -e'(z), which is the marginal
dYs
resource cost of imposing a tax of z. If, when evaluated at z equal to zero, z is
negative, then the optimal z is zero--the gain from a more efficient level of the domestic
dYi
capital stock is more than offset by the resource cost of raising z. If - is positive at z =
dY 5
0, then the optimal z occurs at that positive value of z where -- is zero.
If the Southern government had to choose between trying to enforce a tax on its
residents' foreign-source income or having the North do it for them, the choice boils down
to a comparison of the cost of enforcement, e(z), and the revenue loss, WSN. The best of
all worlds is for the North to impose the tax but refund it to the Southern government. This
saves the South the cost of enforcement but allows them to retain the revenue.
The analysis to this point assumes that the Southern government has an alternative
source of revenue which has no distortionary impact. If this unrealistic assumption is
abandoned, any revenue increases due to tax policy changes increase national income,
because they allow the government to reduce other distortionary taxes. Incorporating this
consideration into the analysis would be straightforward and would, for example, make
imposing a residence-based tax look better compared to the Northern withholding tax.
7. WORLD EFFICIENCY
Taxes can cause the worldwide allocation of capital and wealth to fail to achieve
Pareto efficiency. To see this, first consider that Northern welfare can be written as
(15) Y = rNWNN + wrNWSN + f(1 - u)KH + [(1 - u)(g' - c')]WNS'
I continue to assume that the rate of return to Northern capital, rN, is fixed. The conditions
for worldwide Pareto efficiency can be derived by allowing lump-sum transfers between
the North and South and then maximizing, with respect to capital and wealth allocations,
Southern welfare, holding constant the value of Northern welfare. Alternatively, the
conditions can be derived by maximizing the sum of Northern and Southern national
income. I do the latter.
There are only three independent allocation dimensions, which can be represented
H L L
by KS, K5 and WNS. As Figure 1 shows, knowing those and the wealth and capital
identities is sufficient to determine all other allocations. Rewriting expression (15) in these
terms yields
-18-
(16a) YN =rN(W WNS K )+ wrN(WS - KL + WNS) + f(1 - u)K5
L
+ [(1 - u)(g' - c')]WNS, or
11 L L
(16b) YN = (f(1 - u) - rN)KS + (-wrN)KS + (-rN + wrN + (1 - u)(g' - c'))WNS
+ rNWN + wrN S'
National income of the Southern country is
(17a) YS = f(KS)-arNKS + g(K)-(1 -u) 1 - v t) + c]KS
+ rN ( - w)WSN - c(max(WLNS,0)- min(WSN, 0)) - e(z)
L H L ..
or, in terms of K- K , and \VNS, It is equal to
(1-uU~0H ( - u)rN( - t) _______
(17b) YS = f(Ks) - 1 - v KS + g(KS) - r- . t
+ (1 - u)c- rN (l -u)KS +rN(1 -w)WNS+rN(l-w)WS
- c[max(WNS, 0) - min(WSN, 0)] - e(z).
Adding (16b) and (17b), and using the equilibrium conditions (1), (2a), and (2b), yields
(18) YW =N + YSS= [f(K )- rNKSJ + [g(KS) - rNKS]
Maximizing YW with respect to K yields the familiar condition
(19) f = rN'
stating that the marginal product of high-tech Southern capital should equal the Northern
return.
L
Differentiating Y with respect to WNS reveals that there is no unique interior
optimum value of WNS. When WLNS 0 and WSN 0 or when WNS > 0 and WNS S
L
0, global welfare is unaffected by the value of WNS because total monitoring costs are
constant. When WNS < 0 and WSN 0, the monitoring costs are constant at zero because
L
there is no gross North-to-South movement of funds. When WNS > 0 and WSN N 0,
monitoring costs are positive but unaffected by WLNS for given values of K5 and KL
L
because any increase in WNS (Northern portfolio holdings in the South) must he
accompanied by an increase in WSN (decrease in Southern borrowing from the North).
This does not affect the total gross cross-border holdings which incur monitoring costs.
When \VNS and WSN > 0, any increase in WNS decreases world welfare, because it
increases the monitoring cost of Northern portfolio holdings in the South with no offsetting
decrease caused by the accompanying increase in WSN, because WSN is positive.
5
The first-order condition with respect to KS is
(19b) g' - (c')* = r ,
LLwhere (c')* is zero if W > 0 and WL < 0 and (c')* = c'(W S) = c'(-W ) if W <
LSN N NS 
SN SN-
0 and WNS > 0. In the first case, the South is a net capital exporter, so that all the capital
5Similarly. when W and W . 0 any decrease in W NS decreases
world welfare because, wh ile decre in WNS have no monitoring cost effect, the
accompanying decline in WSN (increased Southern borrowing) does increase monitoring
costs.
- L m (W- L L r -- .-Sc[max(WNS, 0) - min( KS + WNS 0] + r N + rNWS - e(z).
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movement can be effected without monitoring costs. In this case the marginal product of
Southern capital should equal its opportunity cost, rN. In the second case, the South is a
L
net capital imponer, so that there are increased monitoring costs when KS is increased,
L
either because WNS is increased or WSN is decreased (more borrowing), or some
combination of the two.
As demonstrated earlier, the global efficiency conditions will be satisfied in a no-tax
equtlibrium. They will also be satisfied if North and South both operate a source-based tax
with equal rates so that t = u = w and y=0 so that v = u.
If both countries operate residence-based taxes (with equal or unequal rates), so that -
u = z, v = t, and w = 0, the first-order conditions (19a) and (19b) are satisfied, but because
e(z) is positive, whenever u is positive this equilibrium results in a lower value of YW than
in the no-tax equilibrium or in the equilibrium with equal source-based taxes. The
residence-based tax requires the Southern country to expend resources for enforcement.
The stylized actual pair of tax structures (where w = z = 0) is not consistent with
global efficiency. Depending on the precise values of t, u, and v the levels of both kinds of
capital and the allocation of wealth may be inefficient. The marginal product of high-tech
(c - t)
capital, f, will equal rN(1 - v), so that its level will be inefficient whenever t x v. The
Lmarginal product of low-tech capital, g', will be greater than rN by c'(WNS) '
r(v - NO
rN( - v ) 6 Compared to the globally efficient allocation, Southern low-tech capital will
be too low for either of two reasons. The first is if v exceeds t, so that the effective tax on
Northern investment in the South exceeds the tax on Northern holdings located in the
L
North. The second reason for inefficiently low K5 is if c' is higher than its minimal value
of (c')*. In fact, it is quite plausible that c' will be higher than (c')* in the tax equilibrium,
L
because for a given value of WNS - WSN (net Northern portfolio holdings in the South),
L
61 am assuming here that the tax equilibrium is characterized by WSN and WNS greater
than zero.
Southerners are encouraged to hold portfolio assets in the North, pushing North-South
Lcross-holdings into the inefficient region where both WNS and WSN are positive. This
makes the resource cost of a marginal investment higher than is minimal. The inability of
the Southern government to impose a tax on its citizens' Northern investments and the
North's unwillingness to impose withholding taxes on Southern investments combine to
produce an inefficiently large amount of cross-border holdings.
L
Thus, the inefficiency of KS is intimately connected to the inefficiency of wealth
allocation. The tax system induces Southerners to hold Northern capital. This increases
the rate of return on Southern capital, attracting Northern investors. The increasing
resource cost of cross-border holdings implies that the equilibrum level of the Southern
capital stock is below what it would be if owned by Southerners.
8. PROMISING DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
There are several promising directions for future research. First, the model should
be made intertemporal. This would allow us to investigate the effect of the tax systems on
the magnitude of saving and investment, in addition to its location. In a two-period model,
Giovannini (1987) has studied the relative efficiency of a residence-based tax, which
distorts only the intertemporal pattern of saving, and a source-based tax, which distorts
only the locational aspects of capital investment.
Second, the role of Southern government borrowing is worth studying. In popular
discussions, the problem of capital flight is linked to the problem of developing countries'
government debt. By assuming the private sector's debt to the North, the Southern
government may be acting (at least apparently) to reduce the resource costs of international
borrowing. This would be offset to some degree by increased holdings in the North by
non-government Southerners.
It would also be interesting to investigate the incentives of the Northern government
in setting taxes. The reason that withholding taxes are low or nonexistent is probably that
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the Northern countries are in competition with each other to attract financial capital. Why
this incentive does not apply to business investment in the North, which is taxed, is a
question worth some thought.
The ability of direct investment to eliminate the monitoring costs of cross-border
investment may be important. I've assumed a one-to-one correspondence between the
nature of the technology and the form of investment. Foreign investment in high-tech firms
is done via direct ownership, which eliminates monitoring costs, and low-tech investment
is accomplished via portfolio investment, which does not eliminate monitoring costs. A
more general model would allow the fonn of investment to be endogenous.
Finally, the role of the monitoring/financial sector should be explored. I've
assumed that the financial firms that monitor Southern investments are owned by
Southerners, who receive the industry's profits. If the sector is owned by Northerners, the
welfare implications of Southern tax policies are altered, as the Southern government now
views less favorably policies that increase the monitoring costs incurred by foreign
investors.
APPENDIX
I first consider the comparative statics in some special cases. When u > t, then v =
u and dv = du. ien expressions (4a) to (4d) reduce to
H
dKS ,
(A-la) --- = ,, < 0
Fdu (1 -u)f
dKL
(A- lb) --- = , < 0du (I - u)g
L
dWN
(A-Ic) dS c ,,> 0
du (0 - u)c
dWS iL,c
(A-Id) uN 1 -u- + r>0.
du 1 - u g c
Increasing u beyond t thus reduces the Southern country's stock of both low-tech
and high-tech capital, in an amount related to the elasticity of the respective marginal
products. Both Southern purchases of Northern capital and Northern purchases of
Southern capital increase, although the former exceeds the latter (thus decreasing the
Southern capital stock).




(A-2a) --- = < 0
du [I - u-y(t -u)]f"
dL
(A-2b) -- = ( < 0




(A-2c) NS -1{ (g " 2 ))(1 >>
A2d) dWSN ;$.r, 8 - c') (l - Y) .... >(A~) u - u)gw CLI.u- y(t .u) 1 uJ
When the tax system of the Northern country is completely foreign tax credit ('y =
1). then we have
(A-3e) dK =
dL
(A-3b) SK071i7}i "U )g
(Ak)'NS ,r>
(A-3d) du I -u g'8"--> 0
As noted in the text, Ku does not respond to u in this case. K S does increase
whcn w falls, though, because it rcduces the incentive for Southern wealth to move to the
North. The response of Northern investors investing in the South does not fully offset
this. due to the increase in c'.
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